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IN THE

.SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of KENNETH
G. SCRIVENER,
Decew;ed.
SHIRLEE S. SCRIVENER, Executrix of
the Estate of Kenneth G. Scrivener, deceased,
Appellant,
vs.
ALBERT SCRIVENER and MRS. ALBERT SCRIVENER, as Trustees for GregRespondents.
ory Scrivener, a Minor,

BRIEF OF
APPELLANT
SHIRLEE S.
SCRIVENER,
Executrix.
Case No. 8186

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SHIRLEE S. SCRIVENER, Executrix
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kenneth G. Scrivener, the deceased herein, died
on January 3, 1953, as a result of an accident, and
left surviving him a son, Gregory A. Scrivener, six
years of age, and Shirlee S. Scrivener, his surviving
widow. Gregory is the son of Kenneth G. Scrivener
by a former marriage with Ruth E. Scrivener, which
marriage terminated in divorce. (R. 20)
Kenneth G. Scrivener took out a policy of life

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

insurance on his life with the Prudential Insurance
Company of America, dated June 20, 1949, which
policy was in the face amount of Five Thousand and
no/100 ( $5,000.00) Dollars and contained a provision for double indemnity in the event of accidental
death (Exhibit 1).
The original beneficiary named in the insurance
policy was "Ruth E. Scrivener, wife, if living, otherwise Gregory A. Scrivener, son." A change of beneficiary was made on February 2, 1950, to "Alberta
G. Scrivener, mother, if living, otherwise Gregory
A. Scrivener, son." A further change of beneficiary
was made on September 11, 1950, as follows: "If
this policy matures by death the proceeds shall be
payable in one lump sum to the executors or administrators of the insured." (Exhibit 1) .
The insurance company paid to the Executrix
of the Estate of Kenneth G. Scrivener the sum of
Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Five and
99/100 ( $9,995.99) Dollars, made up as follows:
$5,000.00
Amount of Policy No. 17 655 702
10.69
Paid-up Additions dividends
$14.70
Premiums deducted
$5,000.00
Accidental Death Benefits
$9,995.99
(Exhibit 2).
The Third and Fourth paragraphs of the Last
Will and Testament of the decedent, which was adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mitted to probate, are as follows:
"THIRD, I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my parents, MR. and MRS. ALBERT
SCRIVENER, or the survivor of them, of Rochester, New York, my $5,000.00 life insurance
with The Prudential Insurance Company of
America, Policy #17655702, to be held in trust
for the uses and purposes hereinafter set forth:
They, the said MR. and MRS. ALBERT
SCRIVENER, or the survivor, as such trustees,
shall have full power to manage and control
the $5,000.00 principal derived from said life
insurance policy, with the power to invest and
reinvest same as they may see fit so to do for
the purpose of educating, maintaining and supporting my son, GREGORY SCRIVENER, until such time as he shall reach the age of twentyone years, at which time the said trustees are
to pay over to my son, GREGORY, the balance,
if any, of the $5,000.00, and after such payment, the said trustees shall then be discharged
from any further liability on their part. PROVIDED, that if my parents predecease me, or
that if they decease prior to the execution of
said trust, I then request my brother, CLIFFORD G. SCRIVENER, of St. Louis, Missouri,
be appointed substitute trustee, to be succeeded
by my sister, MARY ELLEN WOODS of Rochester, New York, if need be.
"FOURTH, I hereby give, devise and bequeath the rest and remainder of my estate and
property, be it real, personal or mixed, and
wheresoever it may be situated, to my wife,
SHIRLEE S. SCRIVENER, of Salt Lake City,
Utah.''
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There is no dispute about the facts. The question is one of law, whether Gregory, the son and
beneficiary of the Trust, or Shirlee S. Scrivener, the
widow, is entitled to the proceeds of the double indemnity provision of the insurance policy. The
lower Court held in favor of Gregory and the Executrix has appealed to this Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY
IS LIMITED TO LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS
ONLY.
POINT NO. II
THE CONTRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE
AND DOUBLE INDEMNITY ARE SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT.
POINT NO. III
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY
DOES NOT INCLUDE DOUBLE INDEMNITY
BENEFITS.
POINT NO. IV
BY MAKING HIS ESTATE THE BENEFICIARY OF THE INSURANCE POLICY THE
DECEDENT EVIDENCED AN INTENTION TO
LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY.
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY
IS LIMITED TO LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS
ONLY.
The essential parts of the Third paragraph of
the Will of the above named decedent are as follows:
"THIRD, I ... give ... to my parents ...
my $s,ooo.oo life insurance with The Prudential Insurance Company of America, Policy
#17655702, to be held in trust for the uses and
purposes hereinafter set forth : . . . such Trustees, shall have full power to manage and control the $s,ooo.oo principal derived from said
life insurance policy, with the power to invest
or reinvest same as they may see fit so to do
for the purpose of educating, maintaining and
supporting my son, Gregory Scrivener, until such time as he shall reach the age of
twenty-one years, at which time the said Trustees are to pay over to my son Gregory--;the
balance, if any, of the $s,ooo.oo, and after such
payment, the said Trustees shall then be discharged from any further liability on their
part." (Emphasis ours)
The following portion of the Third paragraph:
"I ... give ... to my parents ... my $5,000.00 life
insurance with The Prudential Insurance Company
of America, Policy #17655702" is fairly susceptible
of only one interpretation, that is, that the subject
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of the bequest is life insurance only. The Decedent
made no bequest of the policy itself. Although the
words and figures, "Policy No. 17655702" are used,
yet according to the context and punctuation they
are merely for identification and not a part of the
bequest. Neither did the Decedent make a bequest
of the proceeds of the Policy. Inasmuch as life insurance and not the Policy or the proceeds thereof was
the subject of the bequest it follows, as will more
fully be shown hereafter, that double indemnity
benefits are not a part of the bequest to Gregory.
Further indication of a limitation of the bequest is found in the Third paragraph. The Trustees
were to "have full power to manage and control the
$5,ooo.oo principal derived from said life insurance
policy," and after Gregory became 21 years of age
the Trustees were directed "to pay over to my son
Gregory the balance, if any of the $5,ooo.oo." Had
the Decedent intended to give all of the proceeds of
the policy in question to Gregory he would not have
used the language quoted above, for such language
is inconsistent with an intent to dispose of all of
the proceeds of the Policy. It is a common thing
for an insurance policy to have values other than
the "principal," such as interest, dividends, and
health benefits; and, as in this case, double indemnity accident benefits. Some, all, or part of such
benefits may be made the subject of a bequest by
Will, but if the bequest is described as "$5,ooo.oo
life insurance" or "$5,ooo.oo principal," such other
benefits as the Policy may have are excluded there-
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from. Appellant's contention is further supported
by the fact that the Trustees were given power to
"control the $5,000.00 principal derived from said
life insurance policy." The word "derived" not only
indicates the source of the fund but also implies
only part or a portion of the whole thereof.
The intent of the Decedent to limit the bequest
is further borne out by the fact that the .Trust is
limited to "$5,ooo.oo principal." There is no provision in the Trust to cover the funds which theRespondents seek in this action. The Trustees are
granted no power or right to control, dispose of or
handle the funds which they are attempting to recover herein. The Decedent has made it clear that
he never intended that the Trustees should administer anything other than the "$5,ooo.oo principal"
mentioned in the Trust. Indeed the Decedent has
provided that when Gregory reaches the age of 21
years the Trustees are directed to pay to him the
balance, if any, of the $5,000.00.
Reference to the entire object is oft-times easier than to refer to a part of it. Such is true in this
case. Had the Decedent intended that the whole of
the Policy go for the benefit of his son Gregory it
would have been a simple thing for him to have so
provided. Likewise, had such been his intention, the
subject of the Trust could have been described very
easily; but, instead of using simple words and
phrases to describe the entire Policy, the Decedent
made a bequest of "$5,ooo.oo life insurance" and
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instead of simply referring to the funds or proceeds
of the Policy he .described the subject of the Trust by
the words and figures "$5,000.00 principal"; and
again, to emphasize his intent, stated that the "balance, if any, of the $5,ooo.oo" was to be given to
Gregory on his reaching 21 years of age.
The Respondents would have this Court believe
that the Decedent intended all of the proceeds of the
Policy to go to Gregory. If there is any basis for
the Respondents' contention it must be found in the
dispositive portion of the Third Paragraph. The
Trust portion of the paragraph has the limitations
herein pointed out, which clearly do not support
Respondents' contention and are inconsistent with
the interpretation Respondents would have this
Court place on the dispositive portion of the paragraph. It is a cardinal principal of construction
that all parts of the Will must be read together and
harmonized if possible. There is no harmony between the despositive and the Trust portions of the
Third paragraph under Respondents' theory. However, according to Appellant's theory, there is no
inconsistency in the provisions. Surely the Trust
provisions cannot be ignored. It is submitted that
the interpretation urged by the Appellant permits
of har1nony and consistency and gives full consideration to all portions of the Will, and properly reflects the intent of the Decedent.
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POINT NO. II
THE CONTRACTS FOR LIFE INSURANCE
AND DOUBLE INDEMNITY ARE SEPARATE
A.ND DISTINCT.
The insurance policy provides for quarterly
premiums and states, "Extra premium for accidental means death benefit (included in total premium)
$1.30" Other provisions covering the contract for
double indemnity or "accidental means death benefit," as it is called in the Policy, are found on Page
7 thereof. (Exhibit 1)
The law is clear that the contract for double
indemnity is separate and distinct from the contract
for insurance, although contained in the same policy. The following general statement is found in 44
C.J .S. 1286:
"Life insurance policies containing provisions for double indemnity and disability
provisions, for which separate premiums are
paid are regarded as containing distinct contracts respecting different objects even though
contained in one instrument."
New York Life Insurance Company vs. Davis,
5 Fed. Supp. 316. This case held that double indemnity and disability provisions of an insurance policy
are severable if a separate premium is charged for
them, and that the policy with respect to said benefits can be cancelled even after the life portion of
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the con tract cannot be cancelled by reason of the
incontestability clause. In discussing this question
the Court said on Page 319:
"That the parties themselves considered
that these provisions of the policy were severable may be gathered from the following language contained in the policy: 'Upon written
request of the insured on any anniversary of
this policy, and upon return of this policy for
proper endorsement, the company will terminate this provision' and thereafter the premium
shall be reduced by the amount charged for the
double indemnity benefit."
(NOTE : This is the same provision as found
on Page 7 in the Scrivener policy)
Anair vs. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 42
Atl. 2d 423 (Vt.) 159 A.L.R. 547.
The policy was issued October 1, 1926, and provided for certain monthly payments if the Insured
became totally and presumably permanently disabled before age sixty. The annual premium was
$128.60, of which it is stated ( $5.00 is the premium
for the double indemnity benefit and $16.15 is the
premium for disability benefits.) On November 12,
1935, the Insured assigned her right, title and interest in the policy to a bank, and on November 25,
1935, the bank authorized the Insurance company
to pay all disability benefits to the Insured. This is
an action by the Insured for the benefits. The Insurance company contended that the Insured had no
right to sue for the reason that it claimed the Insured
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had assigned the policy. It was held that the contract
was divisible and that the Insured had a right of
action for disability benefits even though the policy
had been assigned, inasmuch as the bank had in
effect reassigned to the Insured the right to the
disability benefits.
The following is a statement by the Court:
"The defendent says that the policy provides for the payment of a single premium and
that this singleness of consideration is recognized by our cases as showing an entire contract. But here we do not have a single consideration within the meaning of these cases. The
total premium of $128.60 is shown by the policy
to be comprised of three different premiums,
one of which for a specific amount is set forth
as the premium for disability benefits. Thus
the consideration was apportioned to the different covenants contained in the policy. The
risks assumed by the defendant under the policy were distinct and severable with different
premiums assigned to cover each of them. We
conclude that the policy contract in question
was not one entire contract, but constituted
separate and distinct contracts. Russo v. New
York Life Ins. Co. 158 Miss. 469, 128 So. 343,
69 A.L.R. 883; Armstrong v. Illinois Bankers
Life Ass'n 217 Ind. 601, 29 NE 2d 415, 131
A.L.R. 769; 1 Am. Jur. Actions, pp 105, 106;
Annotation, 69 A.L.R. 889."
Armstrong vs. Illinois Bankers Life Association, 29 NE 2d 415 (Ind.), 131 A.L.R. 769.
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This was a policy for life insurance containing
disability benefits, a separate premium being provided for each. It was held that where the insured
assigned his rights under the policy to his wife, but
retained his right to disability benefits that she
could sue for a breach of the policy and he could
maintain a separate action for disability benefits.
Russo vs. New York Life Insurance Company,
128 S. 343 (Miss.) 69 A.L.R. 883, held that where
the policy contained separate provisions for sick
benefits and life insurance on death of insured they
give rise to separate causes of action and that an
action on the life insurance provisions will not bar
a later action for the disability benefits.
Chattanooga Sewer Pipe Works vs. Dumler, 120
S. 450 (Miss.) 62 A.L.R. 999. In this action the
Plaintiff secured judgment against the Insured and
garnisheed the New York Life Insurance Company
to obtain the proceeds of a judgment which the Insured had obtained against the insurance company
for disability benefits under the insurance policy. It
was contended by the Defendant that the money was
not subject to garnishment because it was exempt
under a statute which provided that the proceeds
of a life insurance policy not exceeding $5,000.00
should be exempt from the debts of the decedent.
The Court action held that the disability benefits
·were not "proceeds of life insurance" and that they
were not exempt under the statute and were subject
to garnishment. The Court stated as follov.rs:
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"In the case at bar, the money involved is
in no proper sense the proceeds of a life insurance policy. It is true that it arises out of one
of the provisions of a policy of insurance on
the life of the appellee, but this provision is a
contract of indemnity wholly separate from the
contract to pay a fixed sum upon the death of
the insured."
POINT NO. III
THE BEQUEST IN TRUST FOR GREGORY
DOES NOT INCLUDE DOUBLE INDEMNITY
BENEFITS.
There is nothing in the Will from which it can
be ascertained whether the Decedent at the time of
its execution had in mind the double indemnity
feature of the policy. However, we submit that
whether he did or did not have such feature in mind
makes no difference. If it be assumed that he did
have double indemnity benefits in mind and intended
to dispose of them in his Will, he failed to do so in
the specific bequest, for the reason that the specific
bequest covers life insurance only and does not cover
double indemnity benefits.
On the other hand, if it be assumed that the
Decedent did not have the double indemnity feature
in mind at the time of excuting the Will, he made
no provisions for disposing of the double indemnity
benefit except in the residuary clause. It is axiomatic that for the Decedent to make a specific bequest
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he must have the specific property in mind and the
property must be so described as to be capable of
identification. In re: Campbell's estate, 27 Utah
361, 75 Pac. 851.
A situation quite analagous to the case at hand
is Waters vs. Hatch 79 SW 916 (Mo.)
The Will contained the following provision:
"I hold two certificates in the Bankers Life
Insurance Company . . . of $2,000.00 each
($4,000.00). It is my will that as soon as the
insurance company pays the money that the
notes of W. H. Hatch & Son ... amounting to
about the sum of $2,400.00 shall be paid first
"I give my widow
$500.00
I give to my daughter, Mrs. Vernon 500.00
I give to my daughter, Mrs. Flower 500.00
I give to my son,
Frank Hatch, the bal.
100.00
$4,000.00
Accumulations on the policy in the amount of
$190.00 in excess of the amount stated in the Will
were paid. It was contended by Frank Hatch that
by reason of the words "the bal." that he was entitled to the additional accumulation. The Court,
however, held that he was not entitled to anything
more than $100.00, as provided for in the Will. In
discussing this the Court said:
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" ... It is lastly claimed that the appellant,
Frank B. Hatch, is entitled to the $190.00 excess arising out of the $4,000.00 insurance
policy ... after paying the $2,400.00 due to the
Bank, and after paying the specific legacies
... The Policy was for $4,000.00. The Will
disposed of $4,000.00. By reason, however, of
the payment of $100.00 on the policy after the
Will was made, and before his death, and by
reason of certain earnings of the company that
the insured became entitled to, the policy yielded
an excess of $190.00 over the face value. The
claim of the appellant is based upon the words
"the bal." on the line of the Will relating to this
policy after Frank's name, and although this
is followed by the figures "$100.00" it is contended that it was the intention to give him
whatever remained of the policy, ... The Appellant overlooks the point, however, that by so
contending he admits that, so far as this devise
to him is concerned, such a construction would
subject the devise to him to a claim that it was
thereby made general, and not definite and specific, and, if this is true, then the $100 named,
as well as the excess of $190.00 would be subject to appropriation to the payment of debts
and expenses of the estate. But aside from
this, the claim that this $190.00 excess is a specific, or even a general, legacy is untenable. It
was not in the contemplation of the Testator
when he drew the Will, and a part of it was
not in existence at that time, and was therefore no part of a specific thing which he was
separating from the balance of his estate and
disposing of specifically. The Appellant gets
all of the specific legacy arising out of the in-
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surance policy which his father intended that
he have ... " (Emphasis ours)
If Hatch, in the above case, was denied the accumulations of the policy, where the provisions of
the Will gave him a specific amount from the policy
but also indicated he was to have the "balance," it
would seem that there is less merit to the claim of
the Respondents herein to double indemnity benefits
under the terms of the Will in this case, where the
bequest is "$s,ooo.oo life insurance" and the Trust
is limited as heretofore pointed out.
POINT NO. IV
BY MAKING HIS ESTATE THE BENEFICIARY OF THE INSURANCE POLICY THE
DECEDENT EVIDENCED AN INTENTION TO
LIMIT THE AMOUNT TO GO TO GREGORY.
The life insurance policy shows the following
with respect to beneficiaries: (Exhibit 1) The original beneficiary named in the policy is Ruth E.
Scrivener, wife, if living, otherwise Gregory A.
Scrivener, son. A change of beneficiary was made
on February 2, 1950, to Alberta G. Scrivener,
mother, if living, otherwise Gregory A. Scrivener,
son. A further change of beneficiary was made on
September 11, 1950, which provides as follows:
"If this policy rna tures by death the proceeds shall
be payable in one sum to the Executors or Administrators of the insured." By changing·the beneficiary
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from individuals (first his former wife, then his
mother, with his son as alternate beneficiary) to his
estate, the Testator intended to limit the amount
which was to go to his son, as by making his estate
the beneficiary of the policy such had the effect of
subjecting the proceeds of the policy to the claims of
creditors and to other beneficiaries named in the
Will.
CONCLUSION
We have made a thorough search but have been
unable to find a case which is completely determinative of the problem involved in this case. We submit,
however, that all of the facts and circumstances discussed herein point unmistakably to the fact that
the Decedent never intended the double indemnity
benefits of the policy to go to Gregory. Had the Decedent intended such benefits to belong to Gregory
the easiest and surest method of effecting his intention would have been to make Gregory the beneficiary of the policy. Not having done this, the next
easiest and simplest method would have been to
make a bequest by Will of the policy or proceeds
thereof to Gregory. Instead of doing either of these
things the Decedent did practically the opposite.
Gregory was formerly named alternate beneficiary
in the policy. However, the Decedent changed the
beneficiary from his mother and Gregory to his es-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

tate and made a Will in which he bequeathed life
insurance benefits, only, in trust for Gregory and
placed the limitations on the Trust herein pointed
out.
We submit that the lower Court erred in awarding judgment to the Respondents for the double indemnity benefits and that such judgment should be
reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

of ROMNEY, BOYER AND RONNOW

Attorneys for Appellant
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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